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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

STATE OF IDAHO,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
V.

DARIUS WAYNE HAWS,
Defendant-Appellant.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

NOS. 46225-2018 & 46226-2018
FREMONT COUNTY
NOS. CR-2016-1756 & CR-2017-285

APPELLANT'S BRIEF

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
In these consolidated cases, Darius Wayne Haws appeals from the judgment entered in in
CR-2016-1576, sentencing him to six years, with two years fixed, for delivery of a controlled
substance; from the judgment entered CR-2017-285, sentencing him to a consecutive term of
three years, with one-year fixed for battery on an officer; and from the orders relinquishing
jurisdiction entered in both cases. On appeal, Mr. Haws asserts that the district court abused its
discretion by imposing sentences that are excessive under the circumstances, and by
relinquishing jurisdiction.
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Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
In April and May of 2015, a confidential informant purchased prescription medications
and other contraband from Mr. Haws and Mr. Haws's older brother, and the State subsequently
filed a Complaint charging Mr. Haws with delivery of 12 hydrocodone pills, and aiding and
abetting in two other drug offenses, Fremont County Case No. CR-2016-1756. (PSI, p.5.) In an
unrelated incident in February of 2017, Mr. Haws struck a police officer who was attempting to
arrest him for trespassing; Mr. Haws had been drinking and was intoxicated, and he swung and
struck the officer while trying to turn away. (PSI, p.5.) He was arrested for this conduct and the
State filed Complaint, in a new case, charging him with battery on an officer, resisting arrest, and
trespassing, Fremont County Case No. CR-2017-285. (PSI, p.5.)
At a combined plea hearing, held on April 27, 2017, and pursuant to an agreement with
the State, Mr. Haws pied guilty to the delivery count in CR-2016-1756, and to the aggravated
battery in CR-2017-285, and the State dismissed the other charges. 1 (Tr., p.29, L.14-p.36, L.8.)
At the subsequent sentencing hearing, held June 30, 2017, the district court sentenced Mr. Haws
in both cases: six years, with two fixed, for delivery of a controlled substance; and four years,
with one-year fixed, for battery on an officer. (R., pp.49, 140, 157.) The district court ordered
retained jurisdiction in both cases, to run concurrently, but specified that in the event the court
relinquished jurisdiction, the sentences would be served consecutively, resulting in an aggregate
term often years, with three years fixed. (R., p.83; 6/30/17 Tr., p.40, L.15-23.)
Mr. Haws arrived at the rider facility in late July of 2017 and began classes in late
August. (PSI, p.125.) He was prescribed new psychotropic medications and began adjusting to
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The appeals were initially filed as separate cases, No. 46225-2018 and No. 46226-2018; this
Court has since consolidated the appeals under No.46225-2018. (See Order Consolidating Cases,
dated August 23, 2018.)
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them; he was also trying to adjust to the classroom.

(PSI, pp.112-117.) He had difficulty

hearing and was observed to have a "serious difficulty remembering" what was said to him, and
what he supposed to be doing. (PSI, pp.112-117.) Less than three months into his classes,
Mr. Haws was terminated from the rider program with a recommendation from the Department
that the court relinquish jurisdiction. (PSI, pp.118-26.) Based on the Department's
recommendation, the district court entered an order relinquishing jurisdiction. (R., p.93.)
Mr. Haws filed a Notice of Appeal that is timely from his sentences in both cases, and
from the orders relinquishing jurisdiction. I.A.R.11, 14. (R., p.97.)

ISSUE
Did the district court abuse its discretion by imposing excessive sentences and by relinquishing
jurisdiction?

ARGUMENT
The appellate court reviews the district court's sentencing decisions for an abuse of
discretion. State v. Miller, 151 Idaho 826, 834 (2011 ). The relevant inquiry is: whether the trial
court correctly perceived the issue as one of discretion; whether the trial court acted within the
boundaries of its discretion and also consistently with the legal standards applicable; and whether
the trial court reached its decision by an exercise of reason. Id. The appellate court reviews the
length of a defendant's sentence under the above abuse of discretion standard. State v. Oliver,
144 Idaho 722, 724 (2007). A sentence is excessive, representing an abuse of discretion, if it is
unreasonable "under any reasonable view of the facts." State v. Strand, 137 Idaho 457, 460
(2002); State v. Toohill, 103 Idaho 565, 568 (Ct. App. 1982). A sentence is reasonable if it
appears necessary to accomplish the primary objective of protecting society and to achieve any
or all of the related goals of deterrence, rehabilitation, or retribution. State v. Lundquist, 134
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Idaho 831, 836 (2000). Where a defendant challenges his sentence as excessively harsh, the
appellate court will conduct an independent review of the record, giving consideration to the
nature of the offense, the character of the offender, and the protection of the public interest.

Miller, 151 Idaho at 834.
In addition to the considerations above, where a defendant's mental condition is a
significant issue, "Idaho Code Section 19-2523 requires that the sentencing judge also weigh that
mental condition as a sentencing consideration." Miller, 151 Idaho at 834. (Emphasis added.)
Specifically, Idaho Code § 19-2523 requires the trial court to look at several factors:
(a) The extent to which the defendant is mentally ill;
(b) The degree of illness or defect and level of functional impairment;
(c) The prognosis for improvement or rehabilitation;
(d) The availability of treatment and level of care required;
(e) Any risk of danger which the defendant may create for the public, if at large,
or the absence of such risk;
(f) The capacity of the defendant to appreciate the wrongfulness of his conduct or
to conform his conduct to the requirements of law at the time of the offense
charged.
LC. § 19-2523(1 )(a)-(f).
Although a defendant's mental health is only one of the factors that must be considered
and weighed by the court at sentencing, the record must show the court adequately considered
the substance of the factors when it imposed the sentence. Miller, 151 828, 836 (2011); State v.

Strand, 137 Idaho 457, 461 (2002).
A.

The District Court Abused Its Discretion By Imposing Excessive Sentences
At the time of his sentencing, Mr. Haws was fifty-one years old. (PSI, p.3.) He grew up

surrounded by alcohol and started drinking in his early teens. (PSI, p.12.) He has struggled with
drinking but had also been able to maintain long periods of sobriety. (PSI, p.18.) Mr. Haws's
GAIN assessment recommended that he receive intensive outpatient alcohol treatment, along
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with frequent and random testing for compliance, and recovery support services to stave off a
future relapse.

(PSI, p.20.)

Mr. Haws's alcohol addiction, and his ability to manage that

addiction, present strong mitigation that weighs against the harsh sentences he received.
Additionally, Mr. Haws has a history of being a good worker, having had full-time
employment up until 2015, when the when the restaurant where he worked closed. (PSI, p.15.)
He continued working part-time jobs and he had secured a new job prior to sentencing. (PSI,
p.15.) Mr. Haws has a good support system, owing to his strong relationship with his mother,
with whom he lives, and his sister; both woman came to the sentencing hearing and verified
Mr. Haws's work ethic, his long struggle with alcohol, and their hopefulness for successful
treatment.

(Tr., p.10, L.12 - p.18, L.16.) These family ties, and his recent re-connection with

his twin daughters, also motivate Mr. Haws to change his behavior and remain sober. (PSI,
p.100.)
Mr. Haws also has significant mental health conditions that should be considered in
evaluating the reasonableness of his sentences. He was diagnosed with depression in 1993, and
received periodic medication management. (PSI, p.17.) However, at the time of these events,
his medication had not been working.

(PSI, p.17.) Additionally, Mr. Haws deals with the

condition of attention deficit hyperactive disorder (ADHD).

(PSI, p.17.)

In his GAIN

evaluation, Mr. Haws reported being significantly disturbed by mental health symptoms in the
months preceding his offenses. (PSI, p.106.)
In light of these circumstances, particularly his mental health diagnoses, Mr. Haws' s
sentence of six years, with two fixed, for delivering twelve pills, is unreasonably harsh, as is the
three-year determinative portion of his sentence for battery. Both sentences should be vacated
and remanded, so that the district court may impose reasonable, less severe, terms.
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B.

The District Court's Decision To Relinquish Jurisdiction, And To Require That
Mr. Haws Serve His Sentences In Prison, Was Unreasonable Under The Circumstances
In determining whether to place a defendant on probation or instead to send him to

prison, Idaho Code § 19-2521 requires that the district court not impose a prison sentence

"unless, having regard to the nature and circumstances of the crime and the history, character
and condition of the defendant, it is of the opinion that imprisonment is appropriate for
protection of the public ... " LC. § 19-2521 (emphasis added).
"The decision to relinquish jurisdiction or grant probation is committed to the district
judge's discretion." State v. Le Veque, 164 Idaho 110, 12 (2018). That exercise of discretion is
guided by Idaho Code § 19-2521, which prescribes the criteria for weighing probation against a
sentence of confinement, and which requires that the district court not impose a prison sentence
unless it finds specific criteria are met.
Mr. Haws participated in his rider with no DOR's and little corrective action.

(PSI,

p.115.) Very early in the program, he showed some difficulty hearing, seeing, and engaging in
discussions. (PSI, p.121.) As shown in the C-Notes appended the Addendum to the PSI, staff
noted Mr. Haws was at times "low energy and non-expressive" in class, that he had limited
short-term memory, and a flat affect when speaking. (PSI, p.122.) However, Mr. Haws had
written to staff trying to convey his psychological condition and challenging situation, and he
explained he was taking medications and also having difficulty getting sleep. (PSI, pp.119, 125.)
Fortunately, Mr. Haws's case manager soon came to his aid, and, after observing Mr. Haws in
the classroom, provided him clarity as to what was expected of him. (PSI, p.113.) Department
staff reported an "immediate and vast improvement" that was "nothing short of miraculous."
(PSI, pp.113, 115, 121.)
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Regrettably, Mr. Haws's initial mental and physical challenges were interpreted by his
program supervisor as indications that Mr. Haws was "resistant" to engage in his own recovery,
and that he was therefore unlikely to succeed on probation. (See PSI, pp.115, 117.) Based on
this misperception, the Department recommended relinquishment before Mr. Haws even had the
chance to complete the rider program. (See PSI, pp.118, 119.) Additionally, and as revealed in
the C-Notes, Mr. Haws was terminated from the program the same day he refused to change
bunks. (PSI, pp.118, 119.) In light of the information in the earlier C-Notes, which showed that
Mr. Haws's psychological problems were aggravated when he was being crowded (see PSI,
p.121), Mr. Haws's statement regarding the bunk incident, that he would rather go to "the hole"
than have people on both sides of him (PSI, p.118), should have been met with more
understanding. Mr. Haws maintains that the C-Notes document his mental health needs were
never adequately considered or accommodated during his rider, and that, given the progress that
he was making during the rider, the district court's decision to relinquish jurisdiction was
unreasonable, representing an abuse of its discretion.

CONCLUSION
Mr. Haws respectfully requests that in both of his cases, this Court vacate his sentences
and the orders relinquishing jurisdiction, and remand his cases to the district court with
instructions that the court impose less severe, reasonable sentences, and also that it retain
jurisdiction and place him on probation.
DATED this 13 th day of June, 2019.

Isl Kimberly A. Coster
KIMBERLY A. COSTER
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 13 th day of June, 2019, I caused a true and correct
copy of the foregoing APPELLANT'S BRIEF, to be served as follows:
KENNETH K. JORGENSEN
DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL
E-Service: ecf@ag.idaho.gov

/s/ Evan A. Smith
EVAN A. SMITH
Administrative Assistant
KAC/eas
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